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Summary
In certain circumstances property takings are part of a larger strategy to
further subjugate a certain group within the polity by denying their
humanity or their capacity to reason. These takings involve more than the
confiscation of property; they also involve the deprivation of dignity. In her
book, We want what’s ours: Learning from South Africa’s land
restitution program, Atuahene has called these dignity takings. The
Popela people are a resource-poor, but culturally-rich African community
from South Africa’s Limpopo region that the colonial and apartheid
regimes subjected to dignity takings. The post-apartheid state was
interested not only in providing compensation for property taken from the
Popela community and others, but also facilitating dignity restoration – a
comprehensive remedy that addresses the deprivations of property as well
as dignity. At the end of a protracted legal battle, the Constitutional Court
ruled that the Popela community was entitled to reparations requiring the
post-apartheid state to purchase the disputed land from its current owners
and return it to the community. However, the state went above and
beyond the Court-ordered remedy and tried to facilitate dignity restoration
by expanding the number of community members entitled to land and
increasing the amount of land transferred. The problem, however, is that
over ten years since the much-celebrated court victory, the state has failed
to deliver the more modest reparations mandated by the Constitutional
Court as well as the more ambitious remedy designed to bring about
dignity restoration. This article charts the consequences of the state’s
failed move from reparations to dignity restoration.
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1 Introduction
In August 2008 several South African newspapers carried a story about
a desperately poor woman in her forties who had died in her shack.1
She was not the victim of some cruel crime, nor had she been
reported to be involved in any criminal conduct. In fact, the news
reports all stated that she had succumbed to a short illness. There is
nothing remarkable or spectacular in that. So who was this woman
and why did the South African popular media believe that the public
needed to know of her demise? This woman was Irene Grootboom.
Ms Grootboom was the woman behind the now internationallyrenowned South African Constitutional Court case of Grootboom.2 In
this case the Court handed down a decision against the government
for failing to vindicate Ms Grootboom’s right to housing, a socioeconomic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. At the time, Grootboom
represented a watershed jurisprudential moment in the judicial
enforcement of socio-economic rights. In fact, Grootboom is widely
acknowledged as having played a pioneering role in shaping how the
law and discourse around socio-economic rights in South Africa has
developed.3 However, the favorable Constitutional Court order had
little practical impact on Ms Grootboom’s life, and most certainly did
not save her from the ignominy of living the rest of her life still
residing in a shack. If anything, Ms Grootboom’s ultimate plight well
illustrates the sometimes illusory nature of court victories where rights
are vindicated, but poor claimants must patiently await executive
action in order to receive an effective remedy.4 Unfortunately, in the
instance of Ms Grootboom her wait was in vain.

1
2
3

4

P Joubert ‘Grootboom dies homeless and penniless’ Mail & Guardian Online
8 August 2008, https://mg.co.za/article/2008-08-08-grootboom-dies-homelessand-penniless (accessed 11 December 2018).
As above; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 26
(CC).
M Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with the judicial enforcement of socio-economic
rights’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 415; S Liebenberg ‘The
interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in S Woolman (ed) Constitutional law of
South Africa (2008); D Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum
core: Laying the foundations for the future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’
(2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 1; DB Bilchitz Poverty and
fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of socio-economic rights (2007)
135-152; C Scott & P Alston ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a
transnational context: A comment on Soobramoney's legacy and Grootboom's
promise’ (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 206.
S Liebenberg ‘The implications of Grootboom for current social security policy in
South Africa’ (2001) 17 South African Law Journal 211; C Mbazira ‘Nonimplementation of court orders in socio-economic rights litigation in South Africa:
Is the cancer here to stay?’ (2009) 9 ESR Review 2. There are numerous examples
of rights being vindicated but with subsequent delays in the implementation.
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The land restitution matter of the Popela Community is another
example of how an important judicial pronouncement has been
undermined by the executive’s inability or unwillingness to enforce a
potentially life-changing court order. The article will discuss the
community’s 12-year legal battle to regain their land stolen under the
permissive watch of the colonial and apartheid regimes. Despite a
court victory, their battle is still ongoing. The reality is that it was
nothing short of a miracle that impoverished communities such
Popela and Ms Grootboom’s were ever able to secure the intellectual
and monetary resources to litigate. After emerging victorious from the
lengthy, taxing litigation processes, not surprisingly the communities
expected that the state would implement the decisions in short order
and that, consequently, their lives would improve. However, for Ms
Grootboom and the people of Popela, the government’s failure to
enforce the judgments in a timely manner undermined the legal
victory. In the Popela case, the judiciary deemed it unnecessary to put
in place a mechanism to monitor the executive’s compliance with its
orders; and the community no longer has the resources to bring the
case before the court again for contempt proceedings.5
Relying primarily upon 28 semi-structured interviews that were
conducted in Limpopo, South Africa, with members of the Popela
community in 2008, the article explores the impact of the failure to
implement court-ordered legal remedies provided to individuals and
communities dispossessed of their land. We will explore the
relationship between takings, restoration and dignity in the context of
a state that is attempting to (re)constitute a society.
In her contribution to the takings literature, Atuahene has argued
that, in certain instances, takings are part of a larger strategy to
further subjugate a certain group within the polity by denying their
humanity or their capacity to reason. She calls this type of
dispossession a dignity taking, which occurs when a state directly or
indirectly destroys property or confiscates various property rights from
owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is
dehumanisation or infantilisation.6 Atuahene argues that a
comprehensive remedy for dignity takings involves more than
providing compensation for things taken because the wrong involved
4

5
6

Most notable in the US context is Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954)
which faced resistance from southern state governments to successfully
implement. However, desegregation and bussing were eventually implemented in
part due to a slew of subsequent litigation; Holmes v City of Atlanta 350 US 877
(1955); Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education 402 US 1 (1971).
Department of Land Affairs & Others v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 10
BCLR 1027 (CC); 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC) (Goedgelegen); confidential interview with
Ali, member of the Popela Community, Gauteng, South Africa (2008).
B Atuahene ‘Dignity takings and dignity restoration: Creating a new theoretical
framework for understanding involuntary property loss and the remedies required’
(2016) 41 Law and Social Inquiry 796; B Atuahene ‘Takings as a socio-legal
concept: An interdisciplinary examination of involuntary property loss’ (2016) 12
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 171; B Atuahene ‘From reparations to
restoration: Moving beyond restoring property rights to restoring political and
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more than this. The wrong also involved the denial of the
dispossessed individual or community’s dignity and their subjugation
within the polity. She creates the concept of dignity restoration,
which is a remedy that seeks to provide dispossessed individuals and
communities with material compensation through processes that
affirm their humanity and reinforce their agency.7
International law remedies for past property seizures have focused
on reparations rather than dignity restoration.8 Reparation is ‘the right
to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the
course of the conflict and to be compensated appropriately or any
such property that cannot be restored to them’.9 While reparations
involve compensation for the property taken, dignity restoration is
based on principles of restorative justice and thus seeks to rehabilitate
the dispossessed.10 As Braithwaite states, restorative justice is
interested in ‘restoring property loss, restoring injury, restoring a sense
of security, restoring dignity, restoring a sense of empowerment,
restoring deliberate democracy, restoring harmony based on a feeling

6

7

8

9
10

economic visibility’ (2007) 60 SMU Law Review 1419; ‘property-induced
invisibility’ was the term I used in my prior work. Through empirical interrogation,
property-induced invisibility evolved into dignity takings. An earlier iteration of the
definition can be found in B Atuahene We want what’s ours: Learning from South
Africa’s land restitution program (2014) (‘when a state directly or indirectly destroys
or confiscates property from owners or occupiers who it deems to be sub-persons
without paying just compensation or without a legitimate public purpose’).
Atuahene ‘Dignity takings’ (n 6) 796. A prior iteration of the definition can be
found in Atuahene We want what’s ours (n 6) (‘a comprehensive remedy that
compensates people for the physical assets confiscated through a process that
affirms the dignity of the dispossessed and confirms that they are full citizens).
Atuahene (2007) (n 6) 1444. The human right that most directly deals with the
confiscation of property is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
GA Res 217A, UN GAOR, 3d Sess, 1st Plen Mtg, UN Doc A/810 (1948), which
asserts that a person arbitrarily deprived of her property with no just
compensation is entitled to an effective remedy. Art 17(2) states: ‘No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property.’ Art 8 states: ‘Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.’ S Leckie ‘Housing
and property issues for refugees and internally displaced persons in the context of
return: Key considerations for UNHCR policy and practice’ (2000) 2 Refugee Survey
Quarterly 5.
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc A/
51/18 (1996), sec 2(c).
L Magarrell ‘Reparations in theory and practice’ (2007) International Centre for
Transnational Justice, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Repara
tions-Practice-2007-English.pdf (accessed 11 December 2018), defining
reparations to ‘include, in some combination and as appropriate, restitution,
compensation for harm, and rehabilitation in mind, body and status’. CJ Ogletree
‘The current reparations debate’ (2003) 36 University of California Davis Law Review
1051 1055. Ogletree emphasises four features of reparations: ‘(i) a focus on the
past to account for the present; (ii) a focus on the present, to reveal the
continuing existence of race-based discrimination; (iii) an accounting of past
harms or injuries that have not been compensated; and (iv) a challenge to society
to devise ways to respond as a whole to the uncompensated harms identified in
point three’. EA Posner & A Vermeule ‘Reparations for slavery and other historical
injustices’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 689 691, asserting that ‘paradigmatic
examples of reparations typically refer to schemes that (1) provide payment (in
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that justice has been done, and restoring social support’.11 Atuahene
argues that when reparations and restorative justice are married,
dignity restoration is the offspring of this formidable union.
Most states that have addressed past property violations have not
undertaken dignity restoration as it is a more time-consuming,
complicated, and expensive remedy than reparations.12 South Africa’s
colonial and apartheid era land dispossessions are a quintessential
example of dignity takings, and the post-apartheid government is
unique because it has tried to facilitate dignity restoration. It
understood its land restitution programme as an opportunity to
restore wealth as well as dignity to its black citizens.13 South Africa is
thus an ideal place to examine the concept of dignity restoration.
Using the Popela community as a case study, the research question
explored in this article is the following: When there is a dignity taking
and a legal victory securing property restitution, what are the
consequences of a state’s failed attempt to move from reparations to
dignity restoration? This research question is important and timely for
three primary reasons.

10

11
12

13

cash or in kind) to a large group of claimants; (2) on the basis of wrongs that were
substantively permissible under prevailing law when committed; (3) in which
current law bars a compulsory remedy for the past wrong … and (4) in which the
payment is justified on backward-looking grounds of corrective justice, rather than
forward looking grounds such as the deterrence of future wrongdoing’.
J Braithwaite ‘Restorative justice: Assessing optimistic and pessimistic accounts’
(1999) 25 Crime and Justice 1 6.
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘Property return and
restitution, Kosovo’ prepared for review of Covenant law issues in Kosovo (2008),
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/COHREUNMIK.pdf
(accessed 11 December 2018); Handbook on housing and property restitution for
refugees and displaced persons (2007); H Das ‘Restoring property rights in the
aftermath of war’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 429 436;
D Isser & P van der Auweraert United States Institute of Peace special report: Land,
property, and the challenge of return for Iraq’s displaced (2009) 3; M Everingham
‘Agricultural property rights and political change in Nicaragua’ (2001) 43 Latin
American Policy and Society 61; F Rainer ‘Privatization in Eastern Germany:
A comprehensive study’ (1994) 27 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 809;
RW Crowder ‘Comment: Restitution of the Czech Republic, problems and Praguenosis’ (1994) 5 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 237;
NJ Gutierrez ‘Righting old wrongs: A survey of restitution schemes for possible
application to a democratic Cuba’ (1995) 4 University of Miami Yearbook of
International Law 111 (providing a review of restitution programmes used in the
Baltic Republics, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Nicaragua,
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia); M Karadjova ‘Property restitution in Eastern
Europe: Domestic and international human rights law responses’ (2004) 29 Review
Centre of Eastern and European Law 235; B Atuahene ‘Property rights and the
demands of transformation’ (2010) 31 Michigan International Law Journal 765.
Land Affairs Department: Annual Report 2001-2002, Department of Land Affairs
(2002) 7. Former Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, explains
that ‘the struggle for dignity, equality and a sense of belonging has been the
driving force behind our work as the Land Claims Commission’; Our Land: Green
Paper on South African Land Policy, Department of Land Affairs, 1996) I. The
Green Paper states that in addition to redressing the wrongs of the past, the goals
of land reform policy are to ‘foster national reconciliation and stability; underpin
economic growth; and to improve household welfare and alleviate poverty’.
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First, the failure to remedy past land theft and redistribute land can
increase the potential for political instability. Due to apartheid and
colonial era land theft, when South Africa transitioned from apartheid
to a non-racial democracy in 1994, whites (who constituted less than
10 per cent of the population) owned approximately 87 per cent of
the fertile agricultural land.14 By 2012 the state had redistributed less
than 10 per cent of this land.15 A governmental audit report on land
revealed that in 2017 whites held approximately 70 per cent of South
Africa’s agricultural land.16 The High-Level Panel on the Assessment of
Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change led by
former South African President, Mr Kgalema Motlanthe, recently
attributed the failure of land reform to a toxic combination of
defective legislative schemes, inept governance, bureaucratic failure,
corruption and systemic malaise.17
The lack of redistribution is particularly unfair considering the
constitutional bargain the apartheid government entered into with
the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation movements
during the transition from apartheid to democracy.18 According to
the constitutional bargain inscribed in section 25 of the South African
Constitution, in 1994 existing property owners (who were primarily
white) received valid legal title to property acquired under prior
apartheid and colonial era regimes despite the historically-tainted
circumstances of acquisition.19 In exchange, dispossessed blacks were
promised land reform. In effect, the existing property rights of whites
were immediately secured while blacks had to wait for land reform.
However, nearly 25 years later most blacks are still waiting.20 Most
importantly, there is evidence that there could be potentially
disastrous political consequences if land redistribution does not
occur.21

14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

Atuahene (n 12) 765 767.
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Annual Report: Rural
Development and Land Reform, 1 April 2012-31 March 2013 (Department of
Rural Development and Land Reform, 2013) (Annual Report) 19-20 25.
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform: Land Audit Report: Phase IiI:
Private Land Ownership by Nationality (Department of Rural Development and
Land Reform, 2017).
Report of the High Level Panel on the Assessment of Key Legislation and the
Acceleration of Fundamental Change (2017), Foreword. The Report provides a
detailed examination of the legislation enacted to advance South Africa’s land
reform process and its implementation in fulfilment of the government’s
constitutional mandate. The report presents a toxic combination of gaps in
legislation, often inept governance, bureaucratic failure, corruption and generally
systemic malaise.
H Clung Constituting democracy: Law, globalism, and South Africa’s political
reconstruction (2000) 110-115.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ch 2 sec 25.
E Lahiff Land reform in South Africa: A status report 2008 (Programme for Land and
Agrarian Studies 2008) 2-4; Annual Report (n 15) 25; Atuahene (2014) (n 6) 15.
Atuahene (n 12); B Atuahene ‘Things fall apart: The illegitimacy of property rights
in the context of past property theft’ (2009) 51 University of Arizona Law Review
829.
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In one of the most impressive public opinion studies done on land
reform in South Africa to date, Gibson surveyed 3 700 South Africans
and found that 85 per cent of black respondents believed that ‘most
land in South Africa was taken unfairly by white settlers, and they
therefore have no right to the land today’.22 Only 8 per cent of whites
held the same view.23 His most revealing finding is that two out of
every three blacks agreed that ‘land must be returned to blacks in
South Africa, no matter what the consequences are for the current
owners and for political stability in the country’.24 Ninety-one per
cent of whites disagreed with this statement.25 Gibson’s data suggests
that if South Africa’s unjust property distribution is not transformed,
this may increase the chance of political instability.
Second, unenforced court victories can have a negative economic,
political and psychological impact, especially on vulnerable plaintiffs
who do not have resources to hold the executive accountable for its
failure to enforce court judgments. Since litigation is expensive and
consumes limited resources that social activists or movements could
use for political advocacy and community mobilisation, activists must
carefully weigh its costs and benefits before employing this tool.
When vulnerable plaintiffs decide to engage in costly litigation,
unfortunately it is not uncommon for the executive to delay or renege
altogether on the enforcement of court victories involving socioeconomic rights.26 The negative impact of unenforced court decisions
that reinscribed indignity has thus far been understudied.
Third, when the executive fails to implement judicial decisions, the
separation of powers is violated and democracy imperilled. Socioeconomic rights cases usually involve poor claimants, buttressed by
civil society organisations, who are challenging an executive action
that usually involves resource allocation.27 Consequently, socioeconomic rights decisions serve as an important check on executive
power. However, the catch is that courts have no enforcement powers
of their own and thus rely on the executive to enforce decisions that,
ironically, the executive went to court to fight against. When the
executive fails to enforce court orders in a timely manner, this severely
undermines the checks and balances that enliven democracy. Also, if
the court order was handed down in favour of vulnerable plaintiffs,

22
23
24
25
26
27

J Gibson Overcoming historical injustices: Land reconciliation in South Africa (2009)
31.
As above.
Gibson (n 22) 32.
As above.
Bilschitz (n 6) 135-152; D Brinks ‘Solving the problem of (non)compliance in
socio-economic rights litigation’ presented at the International Symposium on
Enforcement of ESC Rights Judgments, Bogotá, Colombia, 6-7 May 2010).
D Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the
foundations for the future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South
African Journal on Human Rights 1; DM Brinks & V Gauri Courting social justice:
Judicial enforcement of social and economic rights in the developing world (2008).
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then the executive’s lack of enforcement may further ossify their
marginal status within the democracy.
The article proceeds in five parts. In part 2 we describe the
methodology used to empirically investigate the consequences of a
state’s failed attempt to move from reparations to restoration. In part
3, we discuss the history of the Popela community and demonstrate
that they, indeed, were the subjects of dignity takings. In part 4 we
describe the South African state’s attempt to remedy the Popela
community’s land dispossession. We briefly explain the land
restitution process, chronicle the community’s journey through the
courts, and explain the executive’s failed attempts to implement the
Constitutional Court decision in favour of the community. Part 5
examines the impact that the state’s prolonged delay in restoring land
had on members of the community. While the plaintiffs’ successful
litigation was the cause of much hope and celebration, the executive’s
failure to implement the court order has precipitated a deep sense of
hopelessness extending beyond the plaintiffs and including their
broader community. We find that instead of dignity restoration, the
land restitution process led to dignity deterioration.

2 Methodology
To empirically explore the impact of a state’s failed attempt to move
from reparations to dignity restoration, we first obtained human
subjects’ approval to conduct interviews. We then undertook one trip
to Limpopo, South Africa, in July and another in August of 2008 to
interview members of the Popela community. We conducted 28 semistructured interviews with community members, which lasted
between 30 to 90 minutes, were audio-taped, and done with the
promise of confidentiality. We use pseudonyms to mask the identity of
respondents.
To collect our primary interview data, we first obtained a list from
the Commission of all members of the community eligible to receive
compensation under the Act, and randomly selected people from the
list to interview. Locating people was a challenge as members of the
Popela community live primarily in the town of Sekgopo (which
neighbours the land forming the subject matter of the claim) where
few people have formal residential addresses. In addition,
simultaneous translation was necessary because members of the
community spoke Sepedi – a language in which the authors are not
fluent. Thus, on the first trip we used community leaders to help us
locate the people we had randomly chosen and also to perform
simultaneous translation. After having exhausted the list of randomlyselected names, we then used referrals from initial respondents to
generate additional respondents – the snowballing method. In total,
we interviewed 28 community members of which 15 were women
and 13 were men.
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The vast majority of these interviews took place at respondents’
homes. In the same year we also interviewed employees of the Land
Claims Commission (Commission), which is the administrative body
charged with implementing the Land Restitution Act of 1994 (Act).
These interviews with public officials were audio-taped and not
confidential. In August 2008 we also had an introductory meeting
with two senior representatives of the current owner of the land in
question – the Westfalia group. Before answering any substantive
questions, the representatives requested the questions in writing so
that the Westfalia compliance division could vet them. The authors
duly supplied these questions and made numerous unsuccessful
attempts to have a substantive meeting with representatives of
Westfalia.
Ten years after the court decision, the authors conducted follow-up
interviews telephonically with a community leader (who had been
interviewed in the original study) and a manager in the Commission’s
legal unit. The interviews sought to understand why the Commission
had not yet transferred the land to the Popela community.
The methods we employed had certain limitations. First, although
we needed a community leader to locate respondents, there was also
the possibility that people would not be as forthcoming with the
leader present. To adjust for this, on the second trip we hired local
people who were not members of the Popela community to help us
locate respondents and do the simultaneous translation. There was no
significant difference in the topics discussed or answers given by
respondents when the community leader was present versus when he
was not. Consequently, we concluded that the bias added by using a
community leader was nominal.
Second, one strength of this study is that we rely heavily on the
words of our respondents, but when using simultaneous translation it
is important to be critical of whose voice comes through. We posed
questions in English to a translator who purportedly translated what
we said (or meant to say) to the respondents in Sepedi, who in turn
tried to understand our translated questions and replied to the
translator in Sepedi, which was translated back to us in English. The
entire conversation was recorded; the English translations of the
respondents’ answers were transcribed verbatim and may be
interpreted as the ‘voice of the voiceless’. To partially address this
concern and to scrutinise the authenticity of the data, after the
interviews were completed we asked the transcribers (who were not
present at the actual interview) to note when the simultaneous
translation was not in line with what respondents said and the
transcribers found that the simultaneous translation was highly
accurate.
Third, the Popela community consists of about 1 200 members and
we conducted interviews with 28 of them, which amounts to
approximately 2 per cent of the total population. The virtue of
conducting in-depth interviews with a relatively small portion of the
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total population is that, unlike large ‘N’ quantitative studies, we can
locate new variables and relationships by identifying and describing
the meanings that people have of themselves and of the situation.
Our primary contribution in this article is to examine the
Commission’s attempt to provide a remedy for past land dispossession
and describe how successful litigants understand and interpret the
executive’s failure to comply with a court order in their favour.

3 Dignity takings: The Popela community deprived of
land and dignity
Most constitutional democracies have expropriation or, as we refer to
them here, takings clauses (that is, eminent domain provisions) that
require forced deprivations of land to be for a public use or a public
purpose, and require the state to pay fair or just compensation.28 The
takings literature has focused extensively on routine takings where the
primary controversy surrounds the definition of just compensation
and public purpose.29 There is, however, an under-theorised class of
extraordinary takings that have accompanied revolutions, warfare or
other upheavals and resulted in a massive restructuring of existing
property rights. Rose has recognised an extraordinary class of takings
in American law, which includes property taken from native
Americans, slave holders, and British loyalists. She argues that in these
instances the ‘denial of property is denial of membership in a
community; it is a part of a radical othering’.30 Atuahene builds upon
Rose’s theoretical contribution and focus on the subset of
extraordinary takings where the state takes property from a class of
people that has also been dehumanised or infantilised.
This category of extraordinary takings includes the Nazi
expropriations of Jewish property; the US expropriation of Japanese
property during World War II; the Australian, New Zealand, Canadian
and US expropriation of property from native peoples; and the
colonial and apartheid governments’ expropriation of property from
28
29

30

AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1998).
T Merrill ‘The economics of public use’ (1986) 72 Cornell Law Review 61; DB Kelly
‘The public use requirement in eminent domain law’ (2006) 92 Cornell Law Review
1; R Epstein Takings: Private property and the power of eminent domain (1985);
FI Michelman ‘Property, utility and fairness: Comments on the ethical foundations
of “just compensation”’ (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review 1165; L Blume &
DL Rubinfeld ‘Compensation for takings: An economic analysis’ (1984) 72
University of California Law Review 569; C Serkin ‘The meaning of value: Assessing
just compensation for regulatory takings’ (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law
Review 679.
C Rose ‘Property and expropriation: Themes and variations in American Law’
(2000) 2000 Utah Law Review 6, stating: ‘Type III disruptions are what I will call
“extraordinary”. These are the rights alterations that accompany revolutions and
warfare or other or other upheavals that create massive overthrowings of existing
property rights and resource uses.’ This is in contrast to property disruptions
classified as Type I and Type II, which are of the ‘housekeeping’ and ‘regulatory’
varieties respectively.
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blacks in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and beyond. In these
examples, the taking of an individual or community’s property moved
beyond the mere confiscation of things and instead entailed
something more damaging – disdain for a group’s humanity or
mental capacity, leading to their subordination within the social
contract.31 These are all examples of dignity takings.
The erosion of the Popela community’s land rights is also a
quintessential example of a dignity taking. The Popela community is
made up of a large extended family who generally share the surname
Maake, or somehow trace their lineage to the Maakes. They trace
their origins to a lush fertile valley in Limpopo where they reportedly
lived from as far back as the 1800s, herding cattle and tilling the soil.
They married, raised children, laughed, bickered, and buried their
dead undisturbedly until the advent of colonialism and apartheid. One
respondent remembered that the community ploughed the land
‘from the river up to the mountain’.32 Another respondent tenderly
reminisced that in the ‘olden times we were freely living on the farm,
so we could also catch different types of wild animals and the birds
you know which are very delicious, which today you can’t’.33
Under white minority rule, the Popela community’s rights to their
ancestral lands were progressively eroded as successive governments
unjustly transferred their land to whites. The record shows that the
first such transfer occurred in 1889 to PDA Hattingh. Members of the
community remained on the land, but with the passage of time were
transformed from land owners into labour tenants with limited
occupancy rights. As a result of this dispossession, the entire
community was forced to work for the white landowner for half the
year to pay rent for land they rightfully owned, and the other half of
the year they were free to cultivate the land and graze their animals. If
community members rejected this labour tenancy arrangement, then
they had to leave the land. One community elder explained:34
While I’m still young I was working at the farm as a shepherd [clears throat]
if I want to go to school, I was supposed to, my family was supposed to
move there from the farm. Therefore we were forced to stay at the farm
and work for the white people, six months a year, six months working at
home.

Although colonialism and apartheid progressively eroded the
community’s rights to the land and disrupted their way of life, it is
notable that members of the community continued to live what was
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Atuahene (n 12).
Confidential interview with 3, member of the Popela community, Limpopo, South
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Confidential interview with 13, member of the Popela community, Limpopo,
South Africa (2008).
Confidential interview with JM, member of the Popela community, Limpopo,
South Africa (2008).
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described by a respondent as a comparatively ‘good life’.35 Many
respondents stressed that the living conditions on the farm were
better when they were labour tenants than in subsequent years.
According to one respondent, the community was permitted to rear
their own livestock as well as ‘cultivate maize, peanuts, pumpkins and
so on’.36 Another said that ‘[w]e were living better because we were
cultivating our land for maize and had livestock farming and we were
able to support our children, to feed them properly’.37 One younger
member of the Popela community remembered stories that his
grandparents told him about how his parents
had cows, sheep and goats and they were also ploughing mealie meals
[maize] at that farm and other groups of people from different places came
to buy maize because at that time of the apartheid there was starvation.
There was drought, but this land was good to us.38

Life worsened when the land changed hands again and was
transferred in 1963 to HMJ Altenroxel, who in about 1969 unilaterally
terminated the labour tenancy arrangements prevailing at the time.
Altenroxel consequently extinguished any residual rights the members
of the Popela community had in the land, with devastating effects on
the Popela community. Altenroxel robbed the community of their
freedom to use their land. One community member lamented that
we were more treated like animals, you know. So and literally we were just
like a donkey on a donkey cart you know because you will report even a
simple thing like I’m going to slaughter a chicken or a goat, or a sheep, or
a cow you need to get permission.39

Many members of the community rejected the new dehumanising
conditions, quit the farm, and sought employment in Sekgopo,
Johannesburg, and elsewhere in South Africa. One elder regretted that
the new labour arrangement forced him ‘to go and work in other
areas because I was no longer a farmer and what we used to produce
was no longer coming and the money that we were supposed to earn
here was not even enough’.40 There is little doubt that although the
then prevailing conditions forced many to leave, their deep
connection to the land was not attenuated. With a heavy heart, one
community member explained that although he left, ‘I still love that
place because my fathers, mothers, and grandparents are still there,
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Confidential interview with BM, member of the
South Africa (2008).
Confidential interview with M, member of the
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As above.
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As above.
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they died there and we buried them there. That’s why I love that
place.’41
The conditions prevailing on the farm for those who stayed on as
workers were harsh and exploitative as they had to endure meager
wages and the threat of physical abuse if they did not follow orders. A
community leader described the typical work cycle on the farm under
Altenroxel, which entailed working for two days in order to pay ‘rent’
and then three days for wages at the rate of 20 cents per day. Workers
would only be paid after having accumulated 30 working days. The
white farm owner had total control and his poor black farm workers
had no rights. In an unsettling description of the extent to which
workers were subjugated, a community leader explained:42
During those times they would make you shit. If you left the farm, they
would look for you until they find you and kill you they would even kill
you. It was painful, but there’s nothing you can do, but it was not only the
Popela people. All around our area they’ve just been treated the same, so
there was nothing they can do. If you raised your concern, you’ll be
beaten.

Eventually Altenroxel decided to terminate the labour tenancy
arrangement and families were forcibly separated if certain members
did not opt to take up full employment with the farm owner. The
termination of the labour tenancy led to the destruction of family life,
the division of the community and the weakening of valuable social
bonds. According to one community member, after her husband had
left the farm to take up employment in Johannesburg, he was not
allowed on the farm to visit his family as this was against the
regulations. When he did visit he was subjected to beatings and even
arrested for being unlawfully present on the farm. Explaining the
severely unfair power dynamic that led to these abusive practices, she
said:43
There’s nothing we can do because it was force, it’s not like it’s a choice. It
was force because there was no other alternative … to resist is either you
have to move out of the farm. So, the best thing is to, if you don’t have
alternative, is to comply.

One community member perfectly and succinctly articulated what we
heard over and over in the interviews about the termination of the
labour tenancy agreements: ‘We felt powerless.’44
In 1993, shortly before the beginning of the democratic
dispensation, a subsidiary of a German multinational corporation
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Confidential interview with 15, member of the Popela community, Limpopo,
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called Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, now called Westfalia
Fruit Estate (Pty) Ltd (Westfalia) purchased the Popela community’s
land from Altenroxel. When apartheid officially ended in 1994, many
families did not leave Sekgopo to reoccupy their ancestral land
because, as one respondent explained, ‘I stay here in Sekgopo
because even though I can go back to staying there while they are still
there, the land is still owned by the hands of the white people. It will
be difficult for me to make plans.’45 According to various
respondents, life for members of the Popela community living or
working on the farm had not become any easier since the end of
apartheid, and ownership in the farm was transferred to Westfalia.46
The graves located on the farm were a constant source of conflict
between Westfalia and the Popela community. It was very important
culturally for members of the Popela community to bury their dead on
their ancestral land, but Westfalia has often prevented the Popela
community from accessing their graves.47
Normally every year we have this thing of ritual sacrifices where you have
to do something on the grave. So, then you are not allowed. You have to
beg, so sometimes it’s difficult to beg. Even now for us to go there like we
have to phone the current owner to unlock the gate because it’s four gates
from my place to the cemetery. So, you have to ask them to unlock the
gate. Tomorrow we’ll be burying my sister, my sister here. I don’t know
how these people are going to manage to go to the funeral because if they
don’t find him we are going to have a problem.

Many respondents reported that they felt that Westfalia’s blockade of
the graves was dehumanising.
This brief history of the Popela community’s dispossession has
demonstrated that they were subjected to dignity takings. The
colonial government was directly responsible for confiscating the
community’s property in 1889 when they were downgraded from
having full control over their land to being labour tenants for Mr
Hattingh. The further erosion of the community’s rights due to the
subsequent transfers in 1969 and 1993 was allowed under raciallydiscriminatory, apartheid-era laws. Historian Leonard Thompson
explained how whites justified the appropriation of African lands.48
Virtually all the whites in the region, in common with their contemporaries
in Europe and the Americas, regarded themselves as belonging to a
superior, Christian, civilized race and believed that, as such, they were
justified in appropriating native land, controlling native labour and
subordinating native authorities.
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The historical record shows that the Popela community indeed was
subject to a dignity taking because dehumanisation and infantilisation
were deeply intertwined with the dispossession of their land.

4 Dignity restoration: A comprehensive remedy for
dignity takings
Whereas the previous section established that the Popela community
was subject to dignity takings, this section discusses the appropriate
remedy. When a state takes the private property of an individual or
community, the appropriate remedy is just compensation, which is
most commonly calculated based on the market value of the property
rights confiscated.49 However, when a dignity taking has occurred,
the state has done more than confiscate property – it has also denied
the dispossessed their dignity. As a result, dignity restoration – a
comprehensive remedy that addresses both the deprivation of
property and dignity – is required.50 South Africa’s post-apartheid
government is unique because it understood its land restitution
programme as an opportunity to restore wealth as well as dignity to
its black citizens.51 That is, through the land restitution programme,
the post-apartheid government sought to achieve dignity restoration.
The Popela community’s involvement with the land restitution
programme began in 1996 when the legal position of the members of
the Popela community who remained on the farm was placed in
question when an adjoining farmer started bulldozing black-occupied
houses on his property after the owner had learned of the Extension
of Security Act 62 of 1997.52 The farmer wanted to ensure that
occupants would not gain rights to the land through the impending
Extension of Security Act. Fearful that they would be next, members
of the Popela community who remained on the land sought the help
of the Nkuzi Development Association – a non-governmental
organization (NGO) primarily aimed at assisting historicallydisadvantaged communities in accessing and protecting their land
rights. Nkuzi secured an interdict that disallowed any evictions until
the community had filed their land restitution claim.53 Westfalia
49
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Y-C Chang ‘Economic value or fair market value: What form of takings
compensation is efficient?’ (2012) 20 Supreme Court Economic Review 35; R Innes
‘Takings compensation and equal treatment for owners of developed and
undeveloped property’ (1997) 40 Journal of Law and Economics 403 430-432.
Atuahene (n 12) 4-5; Atuahene (n 6 above).
Annual Report (n 15) 7; see also Our land (n 13) i.
Extension of Security Act 61 of 1997. This Act was designed to, amongst other
things, facilitate long-term tenure security; regulate the terms and conditions
under which occupiers of certain categories of land could be evicted; and balance
the interests of land occupiers with those of landowners.
According to the Act, sec 11(7)b states: ‘Once a notice has been published in
respect of any land … no claimant who was resident on the land in question at
the date of commencement of this Act may be evicted from the said land without
the written authority of the Chief Land Claims Commissioner.’
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fought back by legally challenging the Popela community’s right to
restitution of their land under the Act. Nkuzi initially served as the
community’s legal representative, with the Legal Resources Centre
stepping in after Nkuzi had been forced to quit due to funding
constraints.
4.1 The land restitution process explained
The land restitution process has five phases which run concurrently. In
the first of the five phases, an individual or community had to lodge a
claim by 31 December 1998 in order to become eligible for
compensation. These people were called claimants.54 In the second
phase the Commission determined whether the claims were valid by
researching whether the claims met certain statutory requirements.
Each claim had to involve (i) a person, community or a deceased
estate or direct descendant of a person or a community; (ii) dispossessed of a right in land; (iii) after 19 June 1913; (iv) as a result of
past racially-discriminatory laws or practices; and (v) without the
receipt of just and equitable compensation.55
Once the Commission had determined that a claim fulfilled the five
statutory requirements, it verified in the third phase that the claimant
was either the prior owner or occupant of the property in question or
the descendant of the prior owner or occupant.56 The Commission
accepted various forms of evidence to validate and verify claims,
including deeds, oral testimony, aerial maps, ruins, tombstones and
baptismal records. During the fourth phase, called the negotiation
phase, the Commission was supposed to give claimants a choice
between financial compensation, land restitution or some other
equitable remedy.57 During the fifth and final (valuation) phase, the
Commission determined the amount it would spend on each claim.58
If claimants chose land, then the Commission would have to purchase
the land. However, if the claimants instead chose financial
compensation, then the Commission paid most claimants using a
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standard settlement offer (SSO) ranging from R17 000 to R60 000
(approximately $2 428 to $8 571), depending upon the SSO amount
adopted by each Regional Land Claims Commission, which over time
changed to account for inflation.59
Typically, the Commission played conflicting roles in the restitution
process. Individuals and community claimants had a constitutional
right to restitution, but the Commission is both the agency
representing the claimant through the process and the adjudicator
that determines the amount the claimant would receive. Although the
Act establishes a Land Claims Court, the Commission often has the
final word on compensation as the majority of claimants were poor
and could not afford to litigate even when they were dissatisfied with
the final award.60 The Popela community had a unique experience
because Nkuzi was the community’s advocate from the moment it
filed its restitution claim all the way through the Constitutional Court
case victory. The community never had to directly deal with the
Commission until after the court case when Nkuzi’s involvement
waned due to a lack of funding. One community leader confirmed:
‘We started to communicate with the Land Claims Commission
directly as from [2007], but previously we were communicating with
Nkuzi.’61
In the following section we will explain the legal journey of the
Popela community, which began in the Land Claims Court, then
progressed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, ultimately ending up in
the Constitutional Court, South Africa’s highest court on all
constitutional matters.
4.2 The journey through the courts
4.2.1

Land Claims Court

The legal battle commenced at the Land Claims Court. The Court first
had to decide whether the Popela case involved a community or
individual claim because according to Section 1 of the Act, each claim
had to involve ‘a person, community, or a deceased estate or direct
descendant of a person or a community’.62 Determining whether it
was a community or individual claim affected the size of the claimant
group as well as the nature of the relief sought. The Commission
declared that the claimants qualified as a community in terms of
section 1 of the Restitution Act, but this view was ultimately
challenged by Westfalia and rejected by the Court. The Court
59
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Atuahene 108-109 & 146; R Hall ‘Reconciling the past, present and future: The
parameters and practices of land restitution in South Africa’ in C Walker et al (eds)
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Sec 1 Land Restoration Act.
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concluded that the Popela community’s sole statutory basis for
restitution was as individual labour tenants.63 Therefore, the Land
Claims Court only considered the legal claims of the nine individuals
who lived on the land and had a labour tenancy agreement with the
former landowners. The extent of each claim was 800 square meters
of individually-owned land where their homesteads were or used to
be, and the balance of the farm was claimed collectively by the nine
claimants to be held in undivided shares.64
The Court then considered whether the nine claimants met the
statutory requirements for a successful restitution claim. Section 2(1)
of the Act provides that a person or community shall be entitled to
restitution if dispossessed of any right in land after 19 June 1913 as a
result of past racially-discriminatory laws or practices.65 Central to this
inquiry was the question of whether labour tenant rights qualified as a
right in land worthy of restitution. The Court accepted that in 1969
the claimants did have rights in the land and, further, assumed
without deciding that the claimants were in fact dispossessed of these
rights.66 Therefore, the Court favourably decided the question of
whether labour tenants qualified for restitution.
The Court then proceeded to decide whether the claimants’
dispossession was a result of a past racially-discriminatory law or
practice. Although in 1970 the state prohibited further labour tenant
contracts in the then Northern Transvaal where the Popela
community lived, the land owners had phased out the labour tenant
system approximately one year before the state promulgated this
law.67 The Court took the view that racially-discriminatory practices
had to be attributable to a public functionary or state department,
with the result that the main issue was whether or not the claimants’
rights to land were actually terminated as a result of legislation or
some other state-sanctioned action on the part of the farm owner.68
The Court concluded that there were no laws at the relevant time that
either abolished labour tenancy or compelled the farm owner to
terminate the labour tenancy agreements, but that instead the farmer
had been motivated by ‘economic and business considerations’.69
Given the respondents’ descriptions of how their freedom was
drastically curtailed and their ability to earn a livelihood was
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eviscerated by the labour tenancy revocation, in the most
controversial passage of the judgment Justice Gildenhuys argued:70
They [the claimants] continued living on the farm. The only change in their
circumstances was that they received monthly wage in lieu of their
cropping and grazing rights. There are strong indications that the change
actually benefited them.

On 27 June 2005 the Court dismissed the claim concluding that the
claimants had failed to show that the dispossession was a result of a
discriminatory law or practice.71 The Popela claimants lost the first
court battle.
4.2.2

Supreme Court of Appeal

Undeterred, the Popela community and their representatives pressed
on and took their matter on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal.72 This Court agreed with the Land Claims Court that the
claimants would have to show that any racially-discriminatory
practices were as a result of any direct or indirect conduct by a public
official or state department.73 In this respect the Court held that there
was no evidence of involvement of any public official or authority in
the former landowner’s decision to terminate the labour tenancies.74
According to the Court, in order to be successful the claimants would
have to prove that the farm owners acted as an instrument of the
state.75 The Court accepted the farm owners’ argument that the
system of labour tenancy had become inefficient and ill-suited to
modern farming methods.76 The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that
the farm owner was not acting as an instrument of the state.77 The
Popela community lost the second court battle.
4.2.3

Constitutional Court

The defeat at the Supreme Court of Appeal coupled with an adverse
cost order did not deter the claimants who, with the continuing
support from Nkuzi, took their matter on final appeal to the
Constitutional Court. Justice Moseneke wrote the unanimous
Constitutional Court decision that overturned the lower court

70

71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Popela Community paras 76 & 79 (our emphasis). To gain some perspective as to
just how patronising, reductionist and insensitive Gildenhuys J’s take is on the
impact of the nature and termination of the labour tenancy agreements, it is
worth contrasting his views with those of Moseneke DCJ in Popela Community
(n 63) paras 17-18 & 46 of the Constitutional Court appeal of this matter; Popela
Community (n 63) para 12.
Popela Community (n 63) paras 83-85.
Goedgelegen (n 5) para 5 (providing the procedural history of the case).
Popela Community & Others v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2006 SCA 124
(RSA) para 8 (Popela Community Appeal).
Popela Community Appeal (n 73) para 15.
Popela Community Appeal para 8.
Popela Community Appeal para 12.
Popela Community Appeal paras 18-19.

SPECIAL FOCUS: POPELA COMMUNITY

673

decisions.78 The approach of the Constitutional Court differed from
the lower courts in its willingness to engage in greater depth and with
greater sensitivity with the history of the claimants’ connection to the
land.79 More specifically, the Constitutional Court gave careful
consideration to the residual power that the colonial and apartheid
super-structure brought to bear even on seemingly private relations
between a farm owner and his employees.80
The Court first had to decide whether the claimants at the time of
dispossession in 1969 were a ‘community’, meaning that they derived
their possession and use of the land from common rules.81 The Court
concluded that at the time of the dispossession in 1969, the
claimants’ possession and use of the land were fragmented with each
individual family subject to individualised relations with the farm
owner that determined their presence on the land.82 Therefore,
confirming the decision of the lower courts, the Constitutional Court
determined that the community claim could not succeed.83
The next major question was whether the dispossession was as a
result of past racially-discriminatory laws or practices.84 The Court
stated the phrase needed to be construed in light of the Act in its
entirety, its purpose to provide restitution for the dispossession of land
rights and, more generally, in the full context of the history of land
dispossessions in South Africa.85 Moseneke recognised that ‘[i]n
enacting the Restitution Act the legislature must have been aware that
apartheid laws on land were a labyrinth and mutually supportive and
in turn spawned racist practices. And vice versa.’86
On 6 June 2007 the Court concluded that the former owner’s
termination of the claimants’ rights was as a result of the apartheid
laws and practices.87 The Court reasoned that had it not been for
apartheid laws and practices, the farm owners would never have been
able to unilaterally terminate the labour tenancy agreements and
dispossess the claimants of their rights.88 The nub of the Court’s
reasoning is well captured by Moseneke when he writes:89
The racially-discriminatory laws in force and the racially-discriminatory
practices that prevailed materially affected and favoured the ability of the
[farm owners] to dispossess the [claimants] of their labour tenancy rights.
In a normal society based on dignity and equality, a truly representative
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government would have had a duty to protect and respect existing rights.
It would have cared about the effect that any unilateral change in those
rights would have had on the labour tenants and their families. The [farm
owners] would have been compelled by law and practice not to take away
any vested rights in land of others as at 1913, particularly because the
original rights of the people concerned preceded the first land registration
and went back generations. Simply put, without the effect of apartheid
laws, policies and practices on land rights of black people, the [farm
owners] would never have had the power to do what they did.

In the final analysis, the Court held that the nine applicants had been
dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of a past
racially-discriminatory law and practice and that accordingly they
were entitled to restitution under the Act.90 Nine members of the
Popela community arose victorious after the Constitutional Court
litigation.
The Constitutional Court deferred the specifics of how their
decision was to be implemented to the Commission, which was to act
in accordance with the provisions of the Act.91 The Court deemed it
inappropriate to fashion a more precise remedy beyond a declaratory
order as the claimants had not requested a more precise remedy, and
neither had the Department of Land Affairs.92 Due to the vast range
of possible remedies for resolving this land dispute, the Constitutional
Court did not consider it appropriate to venture into the terrain of
deciding what an appropriate remedy should be, especially as a court
of last instance.
4.3 Implementation of the Constitutional Court decision
After the Constitutional Court’s decision, the state conceivably had
two options. The first was to provide reparations, which required
giving the nine named plaintiffs the 800 square meters of land
mandated by the Court. The other option was dignity restoration,
which was a more robust remedy requiring the state to go beyond
vindicating legal rights to property and included efforts to restore
dignity as well. In an effort to move from reparations to dignity
restoration, rather than to simply focus solely on the nine claimants,
the state decided to purchase 2 000 hectares of land for the whole
community.93 Consequently, the Popela community finally basked in
the sweet smell of victory after so many years of struggle and
uncertainty.
The Commission’s first task after the Constitutional Court decision
was to identify the legitimate members of the community. The
Commission verified that 11 families qualified as part of the Popela
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community.94 The Commission then required the members of the 11
families to register as a legal entity called a Community Property
Association (CPA), to form a constitution and to hold elections. The
Commission also had to hire a service provider to value the land that
the Court had given to the Popela community. If the Commission
concluded that the valuation was done in good faith, then the
valuation would serve as the basis for the offer it presented to the
current landowner. However, if there were mistakes or disagreements,
then the Commission and the valuer had to go back and forth until an
acceptable valuation was reached.95 Prior to transfer of the land to
the CPA, the Commission had to draft a sale agreement, obtain
various internal approvals to purchase the land required by section
42(d) of the Act, survey the land, and the newly-formed CPA would
have to sign the deed of sale.96
The Commission faced numerous challenges.97 First, valuers were
not delivering their valuations in a timely manner.98 Second, due to
various bureaucratic obstacles, the Commission had not spent money
allocated for prior projects and consequently could neither get
additional money for new projects (including the Popela project) nor
could it transfer monies allocated for the old projects to the new
ones.99 Third, negotiating with the current landowner, Westfalia, was
a long, arduous process.100
4.3.1

The Popela community and Westfalia

The Constitutional Court judgment states that the nine named
claimants are entitled to restitution for the gradual erosion of their
rights to 800 square meters of land that they each occupied.101
However, this land has since become aggregated with other parcels
and disaggregating the land is not a simple task. More specifically, the
community’s land became an extension of a farm called Boomplaas,
which in turn was consolidated into a larger farm called Goedgelegen.
Goedgelegen and Deilkraal operated as one business unit. Therefore,
when faced with the court order and the Commission’s proposed
redistributive scheme, Westfalia preferred to sell both properties and
not only one.102
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At the time Westfalia operated a large, capital-intensive agribusiness
producing avocados, tomatoes and other produce. The Commission
wanted to purchase the entire business unit and transfer the 2 000
hectare Boomplaas farm to the Popela community as part of its
dignity restoration scheme, involving the entire community. However,
the Commission had to ensure that the farm’s productivity would not
decline, jobs were not lost, and economic development was not
retarded. While the Popela community does have extensive farming
skills, it does not have the capital or management skills to maintain
the existing high-technology, large-scale operation established by
Westfalia. To resolve this dilemma, the Commission had at one point
recommended that Westfalia become the community’s strategic
partner.103 At that time, Commissioner Miyelani Nkatingi said that
as the Commission we are saying and the community is agreeable, we are
saying the nine individuals and also the community should be able to be
given land to benefit out of it and also be able to see if they cannot benefit
in the economic spin-offs within the Westfalia group.104

However, before approaching Westfalia and spending significant time
negotiating the potential strategic partnership, the Commission did
not investigate whether this was something the Popela community
wanted.105 Consequently, the respondents’ primary complaint was
that the Commission had prioritised negotiations with Westfalia and
treated them like second-class citizens. One respondent complained:
‘We were never consulted. The Commission wants to hold the
meetings with the Westfalia, but we were not invited. They just got
the meeting on. We were not invited.’106 Another lamented that ‘[the
Commission] start to go to Westfalia and see exactly what is Westfalia
feeling about the farm and so on. I mean I’ll say they are treating
them much better than us.’107 As one community leader poignantly
articulated, the Commission’s downfall was its total disregard for
process:108
I think we should be involved and know exactly how it works and who
should be our strategic partners even if it’s Westfalia, but if the people of
Popela can sit down and discuss the whole process and start to feel that
maybe they don’t have that skill and that capacity to run the farm and they
think the best partner will be Westfalia through votes then there’s no
problem. I’ll be happy with that if they agree or not. It is not like somebody
has to dictate to us and tell us who should be our strategic partner and so
on.

103 Interview with Letseja (n 97).
104 Interview with Nkatingi (n 96).
105 Confidential interview with 15 (n 41); confidential interview with 11, member of
the Popela Community, Limpopo, South Africa (2008).
106 Confidential interview with 16, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo,
South Africa (2008).
107 Confidential interview with ALM (n 47).
108 As above.

SPECIAL FOCUS: POPELA COMMUNITY

677

Although they knew that partnering with Westphalia was
untenable, there was no consensus in the community on how to
move forward. Some of the nine named plaintiffs wanted the
Commission to immediately give them the court-ordered 800 square
meters of land so that they could begin earning from the land. Given
their experience with the Commission, they did not believe it had the
integrity or capacity to deliver the promised 2 000 acres. One said
that ‘as things are standing we really want the title deed for the small
land. So, there is no need to go for the title deed for the whole
property whereas there is still a problem on that small land.’109 If
given only the limited land ordered by the Court instead of Westfalia’s
entire business unit, community members would have been able to
use farming methods familiar to them and operate without a strategic
partner. On this score, respondents stated that ‘we will plough
tomatoes, oranges, and cabbages, onions. All these things that we’ve
been planting before.’110 Another stated that ‘we are going to plant
and do everything because of I’ve grown up here and I know all the
corners and everything’.111
On the other hand, some respondents were more hopeful that the
Commission would deliver the 2 000 hectares. However, they were
amenable to maintaining the existing capital-intensive farming
operation if only they could find a partner who would teach them
how to run it while not trying to control them. As one respondent
said, ‘I will feel very much happy if government brings someone to
volunteer to run our place whereby that person will not abuse us and
work with us properly. We will feel very much happy.’112
For several reasons, respondents’ resounding conclusion was that
Westfalia was not a suitable strategic partner.113 First, respondents
reported that Westfalia had a history of treating its labourers very
poorly, subjecting them to sub-standard working conditions. One
community member emphatically declared: ‘No, no I say no, I say no,
I don’t want them because even those who are working at the farm,
they are working just like slaves.’114 Second, Westpahlia had
disrespected the community and had done irreparable damage to the
relationship by systematically blocking access to the graves. One
109 Confidential interview with 16 (n 106).
110 Confidential interview with 2, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo, South
Africa (2008).
111 Confidential interview with 3 (n 32).
112 Confidential interview with 20, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo,
South Africa (2008).
113 Confidential interview with P1, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo,
South Africa (2008); confidential interview with P16, member of the Popela
Community, Limpopo, South Africa (2008); confidential interview with P26,
member of the Popela Community, Limpopo, South Africa (2008), confidential
interview with P27, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo, South Africa
(2008); confidential interview with P30, member of the Popela Community
Limpopo, South Africa (2008).
114 Confidential interview with 7, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo, South
Africa (2008).
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community member recently failed to bury her sister in the
community’s sacred graveyard because the gates were locked, and ‘if
you can go and ask them to go and open the gates or to unlock the
gates, it is another war with the white people’.115
Third, given the tense history between the Popela community and
Westfalia, respondents were extremely suspicious of Westfalia’s
motives for wanting to become a strategic partner. One respondent
was concerned: ‘I think they will take all over the farm. Why are they,
for the first time, why are they willing to help us for the first time, that
is why I don’t trust them.’116 Another said:117
No, we can’t work together with them because they will also, they will
again chase us from the land. I don’t think it’s, I think it will be impossible
because we are, those people they don’t like us because they are the
whites and from a long time the white people are chasing people from our
farms.

Fourth, respondents were concerned that the existing asymmetry of
power between them and Westfalia would undermine any potential
strategic partnership. Many respondents were certain that a strategic
partnership between two unequal partners was bound to result in the
domination of the stronger partner over the weak. One respondent
stated that ‘Westfalia will take over. They will keep on leading and it
will just go back as in old ages whereby he will take the land back and
it will be like nothing has changed.’118 Another said that ‘[t]he only
thing that I want is the land, it is our land, not the former owner of
the land. What is the most important thing is if Westfalia is under our
control, but I’m doubting whether it is possible.’119
4.3.2

Moving beyond Westfalia

The Commission gave up trying to force the Popela community to
enter into a strategic partnership, and purchased the 2 000 hectares
of land from Westfalia. However, the land was transferred to the state
rather than to the nine Popela claimants or the broader community.
According to a legal manager employed at the Commission, there is
an internal dispute within the community about how to partition the
farm. A community leader, however, contradicted this view. He stated
that the community was ready to take the land and there were no
internal disputes. What is certain is that the Popela community
continues to wait for their land, and the excessive waiting has
rendered them marginal. The land reform process intended to achieve
115 Confidential interview with 9, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo, South
Africa (2008).
116 Confidential interview with 5, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo, South
Africa (2008).
117 Confidential interview with 10, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo,
South Africa (2008).
118 Confidential interview with 20 (n 112).
119 Confidential interview with Albert Maake, member of the Popela Community,
Limpopo, South Africa (2008).
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dignity restoration lamentably seems to have instead produced
dignity deterioration.

5 A failed attempt to move from reparations to
dignity restoration
When the state purchased the 2 000 hectares of land for the whole
community instead of the Court-mandated 800 square meters of land
for each of the nine families, this was an attempt to include a people
who had been excluded and denigrated under prior white regimes.
While this was an important step towards dignity restoration, it was
not sufficient because dignity restoration is contingent upon the
experience of dispossessed communities and individuals in the
restitution process and not only the material outcome of the
process.120
In her book We want what’s ours, Atuahene uses 150 interviews
with urban claimants in the South African land restitution process to
identify the main obstacles to dignity restoration.121 First, the
restitution process undermined dignity restoration when it
transformed poor claimants into marginalised members of the polity
unable to assert their rights and challenge the Commission. This
happened because the Commission gained overwhelming power in
the restitution process after the legislature had removed the court’s
power to review all the Commission’s settlement decisions and limited
the court’s review to instances where claimants filed a case in
court.122 Since the majority of poor claimants did not have the
resources to bring a complaint before the Land Claims Court, the
court’s ability to monitor the Commission was greatly reduced and
the Commission’s decisions, in effect, were final. More detrimentally,
civil society organisations did not adequately fill the monitoring role
that the court once had. As a result, like a private defence attorney,
the Commission protected the interests of claimants; like a prosecutor,
the Commission defended the interests of the state; and like a judge,
the Commission decided what type of compensation each claimant
received. With the Commission’s overwhelming power, acting as the
prosecutor, defence and judge, many claimants were left
powerless.123
Second, for many respondents the Commission did not facilitate
dignity restoration because the process did not establish them as full
citizens with voices capable of demanding the state’s attention. When
respondents and Commission officials were able to sustain a
conversation throughout the five phases of the restitution process, the

120
121
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123

Atuahene (2014) (n 6) 191-192.
Atuahene 16-17.
Atuahene 68-70.
Atuahene 71.
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Commission was able to more effectively address the deprivations of
wealth, agency, and community caused by the dignity takings.124 A
sustained conversation occurred when respondents attended
meetings and responded to requests for documentation, and when
Commission officials were able to explain the process, respond to
inquiries, and proactively address concerns. Unfortunately, several
obstacles prevented Commission officials and claimants from
sustaining a conversation.125 More importantly, the failure of
Commission officials to give respondents the attention they deserved
signalled that their status in the political community had not been
fully upgraded with the end of apartheid.126 The Popela case confirms
Atuahene’s findings because no access to the courts as well as
communication breakdowns undermined the Commission’s attempts
at dignity restoration.
The prolonged wait and resulting pervasive disappointment among
respondents from the Popela community transformed a potential
moment of dignity restoration into a moment of dignity deterioration.
The majority of respondents thought that their day of redemption had
come and that they would immediately be free to walk and farm
again on their land after, literally, a lifetime of waiting. As one
respondent said: ‘What I know about the court’s decision regarding
Popela is that those men who were claiming that this is their land
[Westfalia], they should know that we also belong here. This is also
our land.’127 No one expected that more than ten years later they
would still be waiting for their land. Mr Maake and the other
members of his community have all been gravely disappointed.128
We were expecting someone to come, to tell us that we will own the land
again and we can do anything we want so there will be no one interfering
with our movement on the land, on our graveyards, our farming and all
these things … It was supposed to be a very big party, then and from that
day on they were expecting they can now have the access to that land. We
did not expect that delay of the government process. They just expecting
well from that 6th of June onwards they can still (makes a sound and
accompanying hand motions like a vehicle taking off) just take the car, hey
my son take me to the grave I want to see A, B, C then no restriction, just
drive straight, so we were not expecting we were going to experience this.

At the time of the interviews in 2008, the prolonged wait to receive
their land brought about a sense of despondency, anxiety,
helplessness, exclusion, marginalisation and resignation. For example,
one respondent declared that he was happy with the court victory but
said that ‘the delay is so unbearable’.129 Other respondents said that
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Atuahene 140.
Atuahene 122.
Atuahene 193.
Confidential interview with 3 (n 32).
Confidential interview with 2 (n 110).
Confidential interview with PhM, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo,
South Africa (2008).
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the delay has been ‘painful’130 and they feel ‘doomed because we
don’t know where we are going now’.131 After about ten years of
waiting, one of the leaders of the Popela community reported that the
community found it incredible that things were effectively at a
standstill and without any clarity as to the source of the continuing
delay. He said that it proved that the Commission believed that the
Popela community did not matter. He believes that there is some form
of corruption occurring, although he could not prove it.
The main finding that emerged from the interviews conducted for
this study was that the executive’s delayed implementation has led
the majority respondents to two conclusions. Prior to the
Constitutional Court victory in 2007, community members believed
that rich whites were above the law and, in this sense, apartheid was
still alive and well. To explain this, one community member recounted
a chilling story:132
White people hey [laughs] be careful when you want to talk too much,
they will beat you. Even now, even if you are in the new government
[continues laughing] don’t just stand up and say you can just do whatever
you want, be careful. Sometimes it’s good for you to sit down. There’s
another guy [more laughter] the nearest farm there. This guy was just
walking around the farm from there. He was looking for a toilet, he didn’t
see the toilet so he just passes his things next to the road. So, the white
guy came and found him while sitting there. Hey you, they forced him to
eat his own waste [more laughter]. Never arrested! He’s rich! Ja, Westfalia is
rich, it’s like government they are on top of the law and you can’t arrest
them.

There was a prevalent feeling among respondents that many things
had yet to change from the dark days of apartheid, and as one
community member poignantly put it, ‘freedom is still coming’.133
During apartheid, respondents, like other blacks, occupied a
marginal space in the polity, and were routinely dehumanised and
denied their dignity. The Constitutional Court’s decision signalled that
the post-apartheid state was actively attempting to restore the Popela
community’s land rights, celebrate their humanity, and aid them in
gradually restoring their dignity that had been robbed in past years.
Consequently, the executive’s failure to implement the decision in a
timely manner was also thick with symbolism and meaning for
respondents. To many respondents the executive’s failure to
implement means that the owners of Westfalia and other whites are
still above the law – the same as during apartheid.134 The
Commission’s attempts to negotiate with Westfalia without conferring
130 Confidential interview with PuM, member of the Popela Community, Limpopo,
South Africa (2008).
131 Confidential interview with Renkie Maake, member of the Popela Community,
Limpopo, South Africa (2008).
132 Confidential interview with 3 (n 32).
133 Confidential interview with 13 (n 33).
134 Confidential interview with Jan Maake, member of the Popela Community,
Limpopo, South Africa (2008).
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with the community added fuel to the fire and signalled that blacks
were still not equals – the same as under apartheid.135
After the Constitutional Court decision, community members are
convinced that some form of corruption is occurring. They are having
a difficult time understanding why they do not have their land after
an unequivocal court decision from the highest court in the land. One
respondent put it succinctly:136
We can categorise it [the problem] into two. First, the people who
implemented the rules [the ANC] are working for us, but the public
servants [at the Commission] are not working for us because they are not
doing enough for the community.

From the respondents’ perspective, the Commission has failed to
deliver on the Court’s promise and, surprisingly, both the ruling party
(the ANC) and the Constitutional Court are held blameless.
In sum, this study advances our current understanding of dignity
restoration. The Popela case teaches us that if in its efforts to move
from reparations to dignity restoration the state overpromises, then
these unfulfilled expectations can have both political and
psychological consequences. Politically, South Africa’s nascent
democracy is weakened by the pervasive belief among respondents
that whites are above the law. Also, the strongly-held suspicion that
there is some form of corruption delegitimises the Commission, which
is an important institution in South Africa’s democracy. On a
psychological front, respondents interpreted the executive’s failure to
implement the Court order as an affirmation of their low worth and
status in society.

6 Conclusion
Like many blacks in South Africa, under colonialism and apartheid the
Popela community was subjected to dignity takings through the
confiscation of their property rights. The post-apartheid state decided
to move beyond the Court-mandated reparations and to facilitate
dignity restoration by increasing the number of community members
entitled to land and also increasing the area of land transferred. The
state, however, underestimated the difficulties it would encounter in
acquiring and transferring land to the community. Consequently, the
community has neither the more modest remedy mandated by the
Constitutional Court nor the more ambitious remedy intended to
facilitate dignity restoration. More detrimentally, respondents have
come to believe that this is because wealthy whites are above the law
and beyond the reach of the post-apartheid state. Also, respondents
have come to believe that Commission officials are corrupt, and their
faith in this important democratic institution has been eroded.
135 As above.
136 As above.
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The Popela story is important as it is the first empirical case to
illustrate the consequences of a failed move from reparations to
dignity restoration. While a state’s decision to provide a
comprehensive remedy for dignity takings is noble, it is not a decision
that should be taken lightly. Dignity restoration is a resource-intensive,
complex remedy that some bureaucracies do not have the capacity to
implement, leaving dispossessed individuals and communities in a
vulnerable position. Since the fall of apartheid in 1994, the Popela
community has been waiting patiently to once again occupy their
land as owners. Many respondents believed that the land is worth the
wait because it ‘will never come to an end and our children will
cultivate even the coming generations’.137 The Commission will
hopefully in the near future be able to deliver on its promise for the
Popela community’s legacy to be restored.

137 Confidential interview with 10 (n 117).

